Given months of heightened tensions, the recent Shangri-la Dialogue hosted in Singapore was an opportunity to calm U.S. – China relations through dialogue. That turned out to be a misguided hope, and in fact, the United States will need more than words to reset relations.
Events in Singapore were bookended by a dangerous Chinese air intercept and a purposeful near collision with a U.S. warship. Given the timing of these provocations, China’s leadership seems increasingly willing to take risks to test the U.S. resolve in asserting freedom of navigation and support to regional allies. Moreover, Beijing has been clear that dialogue will not happen until the United States “earnestly respect China’s sovereignty and security…” The problem is that these incidents occur in recognized international waters and airspace.
Given signals since Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit last summer to Taiwan and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s recent visit to the United States in April, a more significant test of U.S. resolve is likely in the offing.
On the heels of April’s large-scale military operations around Taiwan, China’s Secretary General Xi Jinping visited the Southern Theater Command on April 11th, where major joint exercises are typically run in the summer. This could indicate planning for a larger and more aggressive drill soon, with Chairman Xi Jinping ordering his military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), to “strengthen military training oriented toward actual combat.”
This is not to say the PLA or Xi are itching for a fight, but rather looking for an opportunity to test their assumptions about their wartime foe in a controlled way. Naval War College’s Ryan Martinson has written about this approach, which is called 拿敌练兵 (nadi lianbing), meaning “training from contact with the enemy,” so it should not surprise U.S. political and military leaders.
How the U.S. responds to such a test could either delay or accelerate a future military showdown with China.
If this is what is animating Beijing’s thinking today, it partly explains the reticence by Beijing to engage in any threat reduction consultations. After all, if you want to learn from your foe in peacetime, you want to know how they and their Allies will react in a controlled violent test. Such tests are not new in China’s strategic thinking – a case in point is a series of border skirmishes in 1969 with the Soviet Union.
Given this potentiality, U.S. leaders seem unaware of or ignore the signs of trouble ahead. For example, during Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s Shangri-la Dialogue speech, he asserted that, historically, increased defense spending focused on the Indo-Pacific. Results and actual budgets paint a different picture that the Chinese can easily see through.
More troubling, after repeated calls for dialogue, Austin seemingly blanched when asked in Singapore what his agenda would be for a future U.S.-China meeting.
The Chinese were explicit in the final day’s speech by China’s General Li Shangfu – minister of national defense. He made very clear that China was prepared to use force should its territorial claims not be respected and laid blame for all Asia’s security ills on the United States – ignoring over 100 years of American presence in the Pacific and national interests.
The Shangri-la Dialogue clarified that U.S. and Chinese leaders were talking past each other.
Dialogue alone will not fix this, and if poorly executed, may even harden negative views. Given the very real potential for a summer test of American resolve, action, not words, is required to bolster and prepare U.S. forward military presence in Asia. This is the language that Beijing best understands and is more likely to compel China into meaningful dialogue to calm today’s tensions.
This action would only be temporary; a new approach is required, called naval statecraft, which is detailed in the recent book, U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century. Competing in peacetime with China requires integrating military presence with economic statecraft backed by forceful diplomacy, which has been lacking for too long.
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Brent Sadler, a native of Springfield, Virginia, and an honors graduate of the United States Naval Academy, transitioned to the Heritage Foundation as a Senior Research Fellow after a 26-year Navy career. With experiences ranging from operational submarine tours to military diplomacy in Asia, Sadler held key positions in the Pacific Command and the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) personal staff. He founded the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group (NAPAG) and contributed significantly to the development of Defense Department’s Third Offset and the $500 million-dollar Maritime Security Initiative. Serving as a Senior Defense Official in Malaysia, Sadler enhanced U.S. military relations and managed critical diplomatic engagements. His final naval assignment was with the Pentagon’s China Branch. He is married to Yulia Polyakova and they have two daughters, Sophia and Vivienne.
